Thus far, the Trump administration has concluded bilateral trade agreements with the EU, the UK, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Negotiations with Canada, Mexico, India, and Beijing remain ongoing in varying degrees. Other countries (such as Taiwan) have merely been assigned a “tariff number”—a rate that exerts pressure on their exports and pushes them to seek further talks with Washington in hopes of securing better terms.
On the surface, these cases appear to fall into three categories: settled, unsettled, and settled-but-not-finalized. In reality, the differences may be far less significant than they seem. Partners that have already signed deals should not celebrate too soon, while those still negotiating—or hoping to reopen concluded talks—should not despair too early either.
Divergent Understandings of Trade Agreements
In fact, those countries that have reached agreements are increasingly trapped in what might be called “half-baked deals.” For example, both the EU and the UK face difficulties: their agreements contain very few concrete, actionable commitments, mostly vague pledges to “discuss certain issues in the future.”
Equally important, there are sharp differences in interpretation. The U.S. and its partners have failed to reach consensus even on existing text, leaving contentious items to be deferred. For instance, the tariff on British steel exports to the U.S. remains uncertain; South Korea has not formally confirmed whether it will grant U.S. beef and rice duty-free treatment; Indonesia has attached restrictive conditions to its “zero-tariff” clause on U.S. imports, provoking U.S. displeasure. Japan and the EU, meanwhile, keep stressing Washington’s supposed commitment to reduce auto tariffs to 15%, but the Trump administration has shown little inclination to honor it.
The EU, lacking unified sovereignty, explicitly wrote into its agreement that implementation of tariff commitments must await legislative approval in Brussels. At the same time, while Brussels believes it secured tariff quotas for steel and aluminum exports, the operational details are absent from the current deal.
Investment pledges are another source of ambiguity. The EU (USD 600 billion), Japan (USD 550 billion), and South Korea (USD 350 billion) have all announced commitments. Washington seems to interpret these as direct capital transfers under U.S. control. Yet partners understand them differently: the EU expects private companies to decide where to invest; Japan insists most of its USD 550 billion figure is loans and guarantees, not cash; South Korea has not clarified whether its pledge consists of new funds or includes previously invested capital.
From Cooperation to Confrontation in Global Trade
The “unsettled” countries—Canada, Mexico, India, and China—are all heavyweight economies. Their stalled negotiations reflect the complexity of tariff reductions and impositions at this scale.
The “settled-but-not-finalized” group, assigned relatively high tariff rates, generally hopes to reopen talks to secure better terms. Yet the Trump administration seems unwilling to resume negotiations unless these states offer substantially more investment in the U.S. or open their markets further to American goods.
Meanwhile, all three categories of countries now face the looming threat of additional duties under Section 232. Washington has already imposed tariffs on steel, iron, aluminum, copper, autos, and timber. Tariffs on semiconductors and pharmaceuticals are imminent. Critical minerals (including silicon), trucks, aircraft, drones, and even wind turbines are likely next.
Even for those who believe they have secured concessions—such as a 15% auto tariff cap for the EU, Japan, and possibly South Korea—the practical outcome remains uncertain. The auto tariff dispute has already put existing agreements on shaky ground, raising fears that tariffs may in fact be “stacked” layer upon layer.
Weaponization of Tariffs and the Erosion of Global Order
In short, America’s tariff battles with its trade partners have only just begun. Current “agreements” are not endpoints but starting points. Trump has made import tariffs the cornerstone of his “Make America Great Again” economic policy, and now seeks to weaponize them to expand U.S. leverage in diplomacy.
The global trading order has been fundamentally fractured. A recovery within three years is virtually impossible. More countries will inevitably be drawn in. The once-cherished idea that “trade promotes peace and prosperity” will gradually fade into silence.