Since assuming power, Chinese President Xi Jinping has held bilateral summits with U.S. Presidents Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden. Xi previously told the United States that the Pacific Ocean—and, more broadly, the world—was large enough to accommodate both China and the United States. After Biden convened a leaders’ summit of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with the prime ministers of Japan, Australia, and India, Xi revised this formulation, stating that the world was large enough to accommodate China, the United States, and other countries.
In late October 2025, Xi met Trump, who had returned to the White House, in Busan, South Korea. Xi stated:
“In the face of turbulence and challenges, the heads of state of the two countries, as helmsmen, should maintain the correct direction, manage the overall situation, and ensure that the great ship of China–U.S. relations moves forward steadily.”
The United States has traditionally been regarded as a maritime power. Xi’s references to turbulence, helmsmen, and the “great ship” of China–U.S. relations indirectly responded to speculation concerning a possible Group of Two, or G2, framework, while continuing to project confidence in China’s major-country diplomacy. During 2025, Trump publicly invited Xi to visit the United States on several occasions. Xi, however, did not travel to the United States and instead visited Russia and neighboring countries in Southeast and Central Asia.
Following his meeting with Trump in Busan last year, Xi traveled directly to Gyeongju to attend the 32nd Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Leaders’ Informal Meeting. During the meeting, he also held bilateral talks with the prime ministers of Canada, Thailand, and Japan, among others, and conducted a state visit to South Korea. He returned to Beijing on the evening of 1 November.
Since then, Xi has undertaken no further overseas visits for approximately six months, as of early June. This represents the first such occurrence since he assumed power in late 2012. By comparison, Xi visited four countries in 2023, ten countries in 2024, and six countries in 2025. After Xi concluded his visit to South Korea, leaders of major Western countries, representatives of Global South states, and officials from international organizations successively traveled to Beijing. The resulting diplomatic activity created a scene resembling “all nations coming to pay court,” with both Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin visiting Beijing in May.
International Attention to the Establishment of a “Constructive Relationship of Strategic Stability” Between China and the United States
Before departing for Beijing, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that one of the objectives of Trump’s visit was to seek stability in relations between the world’s two major powers. Following the formal meeting, Xinhua News Agency reported that Xi and Trump had reached a consensus on establishing a “constructive relationship of strategic stability” between China and the United States. A White House fact sheet, meanwhile, stated that Trump and Xi had agreed that the United States and China should establish “a constructive relationship of strategic stability on the basis of fairness and reciprocity.”
In his remarks of thanks at the state dinner, Trump described U.S.–China relations as highly distinctive and invited Xi to undertake a state visit to Washington, welcoming Xi and his wife to the White House on 24 September. Over the subsequent two to three months, the ambassadors posted by the two countries are expected to continue shouldering major responsibilities for communication and logistical arrangements. Third-country dialogues between U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng are also likely to serve as an important channel of communication.
The Trump–Xi meeting in Beijing represented the first state visit involving the leaders of the United States and China in ten years. Xi also told Trump that leaders of major powers needed to work together to formulate answers to the questions of the era and to make 2026 a historic and symbolically important year that would connect the past and future of China–U.S. relations.
Observers have suggested that Trump and Xi may have four opportunities to meet during the year. Since Trump’s election, China has also repeatedly emphasized that the two countries should mutually support each other in hosting the 2026 Group of Twenty and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meetings. Earlier this year, following French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Beijing, the China–France joint statement similarly included language on mutual support for the two multilateral meetings.
Macron publicly invited Xi to attend the Group of Seven summit hosted by France this year. Japan, however, expressed opposition. It was only after Macron visited Tokyo in April that France decided not to proceed with the invitation. After Trump’s itinerary for Beijing was confirmed, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi also expressed the hope that Trump would make another stop in Tokyo. Treasury Secretary Bessent visited Tokyo before traveling to Beijing, while Trump telephoned Takaichi from Air Force One during his return journey to the United States following the Beijing visit.
Strategic competition between China and the United States continues to influence how other countries engage with Beijing and Washington. Major U.S. allies are consequently paying close attention to developments surrounding the proposed constructive relationship of strategic stability between China and the United States.
Is U.S.–China Diplomatic Confrontation Moving Toward Managed Competition?
Xi stated:
“‘Constructive strategic stability’ should be a form of positive stability centered on cooperation, healthy stability characterized by restrained competition, normal stability in which differences remain manageable, and lasting stability in which peace can be expected.”
In practical terms, among the four forms of stability identified by Xi, restrained competition and manageable differences are likely to be the most consequential. They may also serve as relatively concrete indicators for evaluating the relationship. The United States, however, has emphasized that the relationship must be based on fairness and reciprocity. China appears interested in broadening both the scope and levels of engagement, potentially encompassing science and technology, military affairs, people-to-people exchanges, and other areas. The United States, by contrast, appears more focused on economic and trade relations and high-level official interactions.
Since the beginning of this year, the United States has deployed military forces to Venezuela and undertaken military action against Iran, yet it has been unable to bring the Russia–Ukraine war to an end. The United States has sought to prevent China from gaining access to additional sources of crude oil, while China has invested greater effort in both bilateral diplomacy and international multilateral institutions.
This year marks the 55th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China becoming a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. China also held the rotating presidency of the Security Council in May. The South China Morning Post reported that, while in Beijing, Trump personally sought Xi’s assistance in bringing the Russia–Ukraine war to an end.
After receiving Putin in Beijing, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi traveled to New York to preside over the Security Council in his capacity as representative of the country holding its rotating presidency. He chaired a meeting concerning a resolution on Iran. The resolution was led by France, jointly endorsed by Gulf states, and supported by more than 140 other countries. The Gulf states had been subjected to Iranian attacks, while also constituting important partners in China’s efforts to develop relations in the Middle East.
After Trump threatened to withhold U.S. contributions to the United Nations, China’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Fu Cong, used the issue to criticize American unilateralism. He noted that China accounted for approximately 20 percent of the United Nations budget, while the United States accounted for approximately 22 percent. He argued that, should the United States refuse to pay its assessed contributions, numerous countries, including China, would step forward to assume greater responsibility.
Wang Yi’s remarks in New York continued the position articulated by Fu Cong, emphasizing that the United States should fulfill its responsibilities within the United Nations. At the same time, Secretary of State Rubio visited Rome and India. In New Delhi, he participated in a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue foreign ministers’ meeting with his counterparts from Japan, Australia, and India. The participants emphasized a free and open Indo-Pacific, supply-chain resilience, cooperation on rare-earth resources, and related issues, all of which were implicitly directed toward China.
China has weaponized economic and trade interdependence. Democratic countries, however, have intensified their efforts to establish and strengthen networks of collective resilience. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded by arguing that such cooperation should not be directed against any third party.
After chairing the United Nations Security Council meeting, Wang Yi did not travel to Washington and did not meet Rubio in the United States. Rubio has also strongly criticized the functions and role of the United Nations. Competition surrounding the election of new non-permanent members of the Security Council has become increasingly intense, while the contest to select a new United Nations secretary-general is also becoming more heated.
China has maintained close contacts with Global South countries and leading candidates for the position, and some candidates have traveled to Beijing. The year 2026 will mark the 80th anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations. During Xi’s state visit to Washington, a visit to New York to address the United Nations General Assembly may therefore constitute another important element of his itinerary.
The U.S. Congress, however, maintains a highly confrontational position toward China. Xi is consequently unlikely to be afforded an opportunity to address Congress. This could adversely affect the pursuit of “positive stability centered on cooperation” and “lasting stability in which peace can be expected.”
The Strategic Sensitivity of the Taiwan Issue Continues to Increase Amid Intensifying Trump–Xi Engagement
During an interview with Fox News in Beijing, Trump stated that his good relationship with Xi was not a negative development. He argued that it was important for the leaders of powerful countries to maintain constructive personal relations and described Xi as moderate and pragmatic.
While returning to the United States aboard Air Force One, Trump stated that Xi had asked whether he would deploy U.S. forces to defend Taiwan. Trump said that he had deliberately declined to answer the question. He clarified that he had made no commitments to Xi concerning Taiwan.
Trump also stated that Xi held a highly uncompromising position on the Taiwan issue. On two occasions, however, Trump told the media that he would speak with Taiwan’s leader, referring to “the person that’s running Taiwan.”
Beijing is likely to remain highly vigilant regarding the possibility that Trump may hold a telephone conversation with President Lai. It may also increase high-level engagement with Washington in an effort to prevent such a conversation from occurring. Taiwan continues to hope that a telephone conversation between Trump and President Lai can be realized. It also considers that the announcement of a new U.S. arms-sale package to Taiwan would be highly conducive to stability and peace across the Taiwan Strait.