After over two decades of negotiation in each case, India sealed two major trade deals in short order. In June 2024, the U.K. and India announced their agreement, hailed by London as the “best deal that India has ever agreed.” In January 2026, the EU proclaimed its own deal with India as the “most ambitious trade opening that India has ever granted.” The two statements seem contradictory to each other, but both are true. That is because the agreements are nearly identical twins. Apart from differences in quota sizes reflecting the EU’s population being roughly six times the U.K.’s, the deals share virtually identical terms: the same focus on tariff reductions, the same scope of items targeted for tariff cuts, and the same list of excluded products.
Behind the confident rhetoric lies a reality less impressive. Both sides boast of commitments to open more than 90 percent of tariff lines—covering over 90 percent of trade revenues—for reductions or removal. But with the EU’s trade‑weighted tariff at just 1.48 percent, there is little to trim and, therefore, little for India to gain. India, by contrast, may have more to give: its most favored nation (MFN) trade‑weighted tariff across all goods is 12 percent, and substantially higher—around 65 percent—for agricultural items.
Although full details were unavailable at the time of writing, the EU has released a list showing import duties imposed by India will fall on machinery, plastics, pharmaceuticals, and other industrial products. For some, tariffs will drop to zero immediately; for others, they will phase out over as long as ten years. Most of these items currently face duties below 12 percent.
How much does the reduction in tariffs add up to? The answer is: not much. The EU projects that these tariff cuts will save importers of European goods up to €4 billion annually and boost EU exports to India from €49 billion in 2024 to €100 billion by 2032. That increase, worth roughly €51 billion a year, may sound impressive—but in the context of the EU’s $2.8 trillion in annual exports to non‑EU markets, the trade increase is modest at best and the savings in duties no more than a rounding error.
Like the U.K. deal, the EU‑India pact promotes items for Europe to export that developed economies are known for: high‑tech manufacturing, upmarket goods, and premium services in IT, law, and finance. Luxury cars and expensive spirits—including fine wines—will enter India under reduced tariffs, albeit in some cases with quota limits. These items make up only a tiny share of trade and domestic output, catering mainly to elite consumers. They will not lower everyday prices or meaningfully expand jobs in India. Services do find mention in both agreements, but the details are known only for the India-U.K. deal, and they are highly restrictive, particularly regarding legal and financial services.
Agriculture remains the notable omission. The EU‑India deal, like its British counterpart, excludes sugar, oilseeds, foodgrains, most meats, and dairy. That exclusion suits the EU, as it did Britain. All developed economies treat food self‑reliance as strategic policy. They can afford the subsidies and tariff barriers that accompanies self-reliance. This is due to the small populations involved – agriculture employs only about five percent of the EU’s workforce.
India’s approach has the same goal of self-reliance in food. The country runs a deeply interventionist support program consisting of input subsidies, buffer stocks, price supports to shield farmers from price shocks and market operations to protect urban consumers from supply fluctuations. The program is huge and complex by EU standards, affecting almost the entire Indian agricultural workforce of 280 million. The outcome may be the same, global uncompetitiveness, but the program is on a scale that is unsustainable and works through a support system that is inequitable.
For example, India produces one‑quarter of the world’s milk—above its 18 percent share of global population—yet exports less than one percent of its output, mainly as milk powder and other derivatives. An inequitable income structure compounds the problem: one rural study found that while average per‑capita milk production reached 471 ml in 2019, median consumption stood at only 83.3 ml, suggesting benefits are captured by a narrow segment.
Historically, India has successfully used trade liberalization as a politically palatable excuse to scale back subsidies in industry. Similar attempts in agriculture have repeatedly failed, in large part because of domestic politics but also because Western trading partners maintain their own heavy farm subsidies for the same strategic reasons.
India has, within a year, said yes to two free trade agreements. It is on the threshold of a deal with the United States in which there is no reason to expect anything different – Indian Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal has announced that sugar, foodgrains, oilseeds, meats, and dairy will be excluded from the list of tradeable items. It is the same excluded list as in the agreements with the United Kingdom and Europe. If these items are also excluded in the deal with the United States, the phrase “historic deal” already being used by both sides will, sadly, turn out to be true only in the sense of history repeating itself. All three agreements could turn out to be ‘Much “I do” About Nothing.’
By: Rafiq Dossani