Since Xi Jinping assumed the position of General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), speculation about the fragility of his power has never ceased, with fresh rumors surfacing again recently. Unlike in the past, when such claims were often fueled by certain media outlets, commentators, or online influencers seeking traffic, this time they were echoed by figures in the United States with backgrounds in national security and diplomacy. Notably, former Trump administration National Security Advisor Michael Flynn and former U.S. Ambassador to Bermuda Gregory Slayton—who also taught at the University of International Business and Economics in Beijing—have weighed in.
It is worth emphasizing, however, that assessments of China’s political landscape—particularly personnel matters—typically draw from academic research, policy analysis, and intelligence sources. This article can only proceed from the first two dimensions.
The Path of Power Consolidation
When Xi took office at the 18th Party Congress in 2012, speculation swirled that rival factions could eventually oust him through political infighting or even a coup. Rumors such as “Xi down, Li (Keqiang) up” and the notion of “two party centers” circulated widely, yet reality unfolded in the opposite direction: Xi’s power only grew stronger and more centralized.
Intra-CCP conflict can be understood across three overlapping dimensions—power struggles, ideological disputes, and policy differences. During Xi’s first two terms, especially in his later years alongside Premier Li Keqiang, tensions largely narrowed to policy disagreements: the state-market relationship, attitudes toward the private sector, rural and agricultural reforms, and the question of whether “targeted poverty alleviation” had been achieved. These disputes largely subsided following the personnel reshuffles at the 20th Party Congress.
What distinguishes recent developments is that the personnel controversies have not emerged from factional clashes, but from the removal or sidelining of Xi’s own appointees. Over the past two years, former Foreign Minister Qin Gang and former Defense Minister Li Shangfu were both dismissed; Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairman He Weidong disappeared from public view for months; CMC Political Work Department Director Miao Hua was removed; former Organization Department head Li Ganjie and former United Front Department head Shi Taifeng were abruptly swapped; and Xinjiang Party Secretary Ma Xingrui was replaced by former United Front deputy Chen Xiaojian. Meanwhile, a series of senior PLA officers fell in corruption purges.
The fact that several of these figures—Li Ganjie, Shi Taifeng, He Weidong, and Ma Xingrui—were serving members of the Politburo when removed is particularly unusual, fueling external speculation about Xi’s vulnerability.
Anti-Xi Narratives: Diverse Yet Contradictory
Those arguing that Xi’s power is weakening often point to the downfall of his protégés as evidence of a gathering “anti-Xi” force, with speculation that prominent figures from the Communist Youth League faction such as Wang Yang and Hu Chunhua might step in.
Another narrative, promoted by Flynn, suggests that Xi’s successors are more likely to be his own allies: Ding Xuexiang as Party General Secretary, Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Jining as Premier, and CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia as military chief.
At first glance, both perspectives converge on the assumption of Xi’s imminent fall. But they are mutually contradictory: one assumes a Youth League revival, the other a reshuffle within Xi’s own camp. In reality, the Youth League faction lost virtually all political relevance after the 20th Party Congress, particularly with Hu Jintao’s forced exit and Li Keqiang’s untimely death. Suggesting that Xi could be replaced by his own confidants is also logically incoherent.
Disappearances, Meetings, and Misread Signals
Some critics highlight Xi’s occasional absence from public events—as when he “disappeared” for two weeks recently—as evidence of political decline. Yet Xi has skipped appearances before, and such suspicions have repeatedly proven unfounded. In recent months, he has remained active internationally and domestically: a state visit to Russia in early May, a call with former U.S. President Donald Trump in early June, participation in the China–Central Asia Summit in Kazakhstan, receptions of foreign dignitaries, local inspection tours, and regular coverage in Xinwen Lianbo and People’s Daily.
Another criticism has been the supposed absence of Politburo meetings. However, similar claims have arisen in the past, only to be disproven when meetings were later acknowledged. Indeed, on June 30 the Politburo convened and passed the “Regulations on the Work of Party Central Decision-Making and Deliberative Coordination Bodies.” Given Xi’s emphasis on governing through “leading small groups” and committees, this move has been interpreted by some as a constraint on his authority. But the regulation itself, framed as an effort to “strengthen unified Party leadership over major tasks,” confirms a system of top-level design, with policy execution delegated to the State Council under the Party’s leadership. It hardly suggests Xi’s power is diminishing.
Conclusion: A Black Box with Strategic Implications
Elite politics in China remains opaque, akin to a “black box.” For Taiwan, however, analyzing these dynamics is more than an academic exercise—it is a matter of national security. At a time when China studies have become extraordinarily difficult worldwide, Taiwan’s comparative advantage lies in its ability to conduct accurate, objective assessments. Getting these judgments right is not only critical for policy but essential for safeguarding Taiwan’s broader strategic interests.